
Social Conditions as Epistemic Justification

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“We are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power
except through the production of truth” -Michel Foucault

Abstract

The present paper entitled *Epistemic justification and Social Conditions as Epistemic Justification*, aims to expose the practical social interests of institutionalizing the modernist paradigms of knowledge and its alleged truth-conditions by means of which dispelling the other status of knowledge as misnomer leaving behind undue hegemony of positivistic, capitalistic, industrialist, and technocratic types/forms of knowledge. The paper further tries to argue that the result of modernist version on the status of knowledge as authentic condition of truth, in turn resulted in specific practices of domination and subordination. The modern trends of *ontologizing* knowledge (knowledge have structures independent perceiving mind and the social conditions) as objective and benchmarking its criterion as empirical-rational (*Cartesian-Kantian Syndrome*) with in modernity (*isomorphic*) and treating knowledge as productive (*pragmatic*) in fact veils a specific logic of domination for subordination of the fragile-Other.

Keywords: Epistemic Justification, Cartesian-Kantian Syndrome, pragmatic, verificationism, epistemic-moral, colonializing

Introduction

The question of justification of knowledge (epistemic justification) occupies a centre stage of discourse in modern theories of knowledge. Most theories of knowledge and truth with in modernity (Hegelian, Cartesian rationalistic, Positivistic (verificationism) , Early Linguistic, Kantian, and Heideggerian) generally agree that the modern society is drastically different from the pre-modern society and such a difference is accounted on its claim that knowledge in order to be true must pass the test of certain necessary and sufficient conditions. The different versions of such conditions are rationalistic, empirical, pragmatic, industrial, capitalistic utilitarian and technocratic etc and these facets or conditions of knowledge were held to be true forms/types of knowledge, characterizing the very idea of human development.

I contend that, Edmund L. Gettier's objections to both the traditional and modern analysis of knowledge, in his paper, 'Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?', do fall within the parameters of modernity and thereby seriously misses to look at the issue of knowledge/truth on the grounds of its social conditions and interests. His objections to (a) traditionalistic, (b) Roderick Chisholm's and (C) A.J. Ayer's analysis of knowledge are based on the grounds that (i) "(a) is false in that the conditions stated therein do not constitute a sufficient condition for the truth of the proposition that S knows that P" and (ii) (b) and (c) are false because believing something do not always entails any necessary condition to validate its truth. Moreover Gettier

further contends that the notion of 'belief' and its justification can be extended even to false beliefs. (Refer the entire paper of Gettier) Thus his objections/arguments rely on two important rationalities/conditions namely: incoherency of the traditional theory of truth and knowledge and non-correspondence (of the Modern theories of truth). By giving out two more illustrative cases, Gettier argues that the modern theories of truth/knowledge of Roderick Chisholm's and A.J. Ayer's do not entail the alleged conditions of truth/knowledge.

The epistemic justifications (including that of Gettier's) though rationally persuasive may be characterized as modernist-exclusivist of the forms of knowledge of a social and cultural plurality of people. It remains to be highly value dualistic and self-negating and unethical. However, powerful the arguments may be Gettier's analysis falls within the ontological category of looking for essentials (necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge and truth) within the set-conditions of modernity and as well misses the idea that truth is often socially produced and context-conditioned. Gettier seems to assume that justification of knowledge/ truth is possible by providing further (truth) sufficient conditions within the frame work of modernity, forgetting the fact that such knowledge-claims and truth-conditions is often counter-productive. Against which, basing ourselves on the strength of the criticism leveled against modernity by the postmodern question on knowledge, we can say that there is no truth as such and what is claimed to be true is only a modernist cultural production and it is purpose-intended. In fact, by enabling knowledge/truth within the paradigms of modernity, other forms of knowledge are either silenced or erased and such enabling in fact disables multiple forms of knowledge.

The enlightenment of 17th century is the commencement of modernity. The advent of modernity first in Europe exercised a specific type of epistemological assumption, namely that knowledge is certain, rational, objective and is accessible to humans only. This in turn implied that the world is cognizable, alterable, and can be made objectively present to the free and rational individual who is none other than the western human individual. The advocates of modernity like Descartes, Spinoza, Francis Bacon, Newton, Galileo, Hegel, Freud, Darwin, Carnap, Karl Marx, William James, and many others are corporately responsible for the cultural practice of the epistemic justifications and assertions that constructed the culture of modernity in Europe. Departing clearly from the religious ontology (medieval/scholastic), many of the modern thinkers in the west asserted that truth is not from above that is to say that they are not divinely-grounded and authenticated by a theory of coherence, but knowledge/truth is man-centric. 'It is the rational individual who is the authority of truth and knowledge, for 'man is a rational autonomous being who cognizes the world'¹¹. And it is this human cognition that produces truth and its social values. The rational man of modernity is thus conceived to be the measure of all things and the foundation of moral judgments. The pre-modern truth-claims were increasingly toppled down and as a result, the epoch of modernity witnessed revolutions in epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, science, politics and culture. Identifiable revolutions in modern societies include the industrial, the French, the Russian, and the American etc. Along with modernity, we have also witnessed the world wars and the post world war social conditions that continue to

¹¹ See, Grenz J. Stanley, *A Primer on Postmodernism*, Cambridge, Wm B. Eerdmans Pub.co, 1996.

express itself in various forms such as transnational capitalism, global village, formation of communicative technocratic society. European modernity with its epistemic criterions (truth-conditions) gave rise to a sense of incisive aversion to medieval ways of thinking and social organization. It relegated religion to a private sphere and the rational scientific knowledge-claims were pushed to the public sphere which resulted in the secularization and globalization of the world as perceivable within a monolithic ontology and the modernist construction of nation-state increasingly turned into erosion of political sovereignties (politically monopolizing power-relations) through out the globe. Thus the era modernity with its epistemic justifications and enlightenment ethics has been both constructive and destructive. It constructed individualization of individuals competitively against each other and each one striving towards material affluence but only at the expense of destroying the fragile social-other. Modernity promised progress on the epistemic touchstones of reason, science and utility of technology. As a result, 'human kind in its avarice to progress and happiness reduced the cultural diversity to a mono-dimensional form of perceiving and living'¹².

Modernity as culture and Modernism as its epistemic-moral stand point projected a scientifically patterned/disciplined social order based on the capitalistic technocratic economy only at the expense of flattening the diversities of cultures and forms of life. It projected an industrialized/mechanized form of life as the ideal form which is built on the foundations of modern theories of knowledge. In modernity, humans treated themselves as autonomous, rational, truth provisioning individuals over and against the social, people and the ecological. Constructing a homogeneous culture as the ideal, it consumed the cultural diversities through new forms of colonialism. In other words, the chief social crisis that resulted in modernity is that humans (Europeans) began to define themselves *oppositionally and exclusivistically*. Those who were said to possess scientific-technocratic rationality and modernist economy, by the virtue of their 'possession of truth' (through their power of 'colonializing' the-Other), have learnt to place themselves as exclusively against the less or not sufficiently industrialized ones. The privileged sections of people belonging to any technologically advanced countries placed themselves as superiors (and competitors) who seek to win over the racial race of success and progress. Either through subtle or militant forms of colonialization, (the social practice of modernist epistemology) the industrially dominant people began to dominate the fragile-Other, namely the people of the less or developing countries. People were placed against each other in/through modernity with in the epistemic conditions of modernism. Modernity as a culture promoted a culture of domination, where in the face of the powerless ones is structured in subordination to the approval of the industrially, economically, and technologically powerful ones.

The Oppositional and exclusivist dimension of modernity has yet another important dimension. The scientific-human, by defining himself as autonomous ego, distanced himself oppositionally away from nature (environment) and those people who were treated as no-people. The fragility and the maternity of nature have been vulgarized in terms of human power and

¹² For a detailed critique of technocratic rationality that constructs monolithic culture, Refer Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man*, 1964,).

malechuanist-pragmatist outlook of life. Modernity with its claim of advancement of science and technology has unfortunately given rise to subordination of the plurality of people. In modernity the fragile-Other, is often structured as a potential threat and is increasingly silenced as anti-developmental. The fragile-Other is often a silenced victim, the one as a result of exclusion from some power-center, and s/he is forced to lack the power of self-assertion, expression and affirmation. Thus the epistemic claims and its alleged social conditions of modernity have lead to a deep sense of alienation of the human spirit in an encounter of despair, anxiety, and meaninglessness. The so-called success/progress of modernity is deemed beautiful; it is but the aesthetization torture, killing of the powerless ethnicity, destroying of cultures, erosion of nature and people whose life is intrinsically related with nature, and describing such destruction as 'beautiful' death' and erasing of terrorism. Humans were turned to be prisoners of modernity. "We are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth". ... We must produce truth in order to produce wealth... We are subjected to truth in the sense in which it is (such) truth that that makes laws and social relations. "In the end,, we are judged, condemned, classified, determined in our undertakings, destined to a certain mode of living or dying, as a function of true discourses which are bearers of the specific effects of power"¹³. Thus the epistemic justifications and its social conditions of modernity remain profoundly fractured. This in fact is one of the deepest dimensions of the crisis of modern or late-modern society.

At the heart of modernity, is there ego of the individual (western) self. The "individualism of modernity"¹⁴ expresses itself in economic and political practices of cultural and social control and domination. This has been described as "dehumanization of humankind' and "denaturalization of nature"¹⁵. It attempts to create an economic power-center whose other side is the political control of the fragile/vulnerable nations. Transnational capitalism, Economic globalism, liberalism, etc has a singular foundation i.e., the desire to play superior. This is sort of a re-assertion of the Greek dictum that 'BEING IS' and it is fundamentally singular' (Parmenides) and anything other than this ONE- Being, namely any Other being/thing must either be assimilated (reduced) into the ONE, or excluded/erased as Non-Being. In the construct of modernism, the Being of the western/European is One and therefore assumes the privilege of oppositionally constructing or distancing itself from any other being(s) relegating them as non-beings. Max Horkheimer and Theodor Aorno in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 1944, points out that Enlightenment's tendencies are self-negating (or dialectical). Enlightened reason rejects all metaphysical & religious sources of value, adhering to power & self-interest only. Enlightenment is the only road to social freedom but this always leads to totalitarianism.

In the epistemic criterions of modernism and its alleged political practices of modernity - the fragile-Other, namely the poor, the women, and the historically colonized and discriminated

¹³ Refer, Michel Foucault: *Power/Knowledge*, 1976.

¹⁴ David Ray Griffin, ed., *Spirituality and Society: Postmodern Visions* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), p.3.

¹⁵ See Donald W. Mitchell, *Spirituality and Emptiness: The Dynamics of Spiritual life in Buddhism and Christianity* (New York: Paulist, 1991) chapter 2.

people (Dalits within the Caste-ontology) and the nature– are increasingly devalued, dismayed and denied of any positive affirmation. Within the social conditions of modernity, between the Being of the Centre and the oppositionally constructed lesser Beings or nonbeings of the periphery, arises a rupture and a continuous tension or competition. The social conditions promoted by modernity make inroads of violence, and therefore tend to be anti-social.

Related to the problem of individualism (epistemic, political, economic, rational, autonomous etc) of modernism, is the problem of “dualism”¹⁶. From an epistemological stand point, dualism gives rise to an impassable gap between the alleged rational and the relegated non-rational, human and lesser humans, culture and nature, privileged and the unprivileged, powerful and powerless, rich and the poor, male and female, superior and inferior, White and Black, pure and impure, high caste and low caste or outcaste etc. The deemed rational (epistemic) centers constructs themselves as political powers as against the peripheries. Allied with the problem of epistemic dualism is the crisis of hierarchical value-dualism, which assumes that that the successive ladders of power centers because of its economic, political and technocratic status quo, has the power over/against the less or powerless ones. As result, modernity propounds a practice of social Darwinism. As against this practice of epistemic justification within modernity, Foucault argues that the modern conceptions of knowledge/truth is power-oriented, and while speaking so, he does not imply that knowledge by virtue of it is power, but the point is to emphasize the reciprocal (mutual) relations of power and knowledge in modernity, the purpose of which is to professionally ‘discipline’ or imprison human minds within the social conditions of capitalistic modern society. Truth is thus monopolized and has a practical content of power-relations. Truth and knowledge within the parameters of modernity is morally motivated, and the ethos of such motivation is domination, assimilation and subordination (Social Darwinism) and if possible the elimination of those particularities that are rendered unfit to the truth/knowledge-conditions of modernity. In modernity, Foucault points out that, “We are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth”. .. and in the end, “we (humans) are judged, condemned, classified, determined in our undertakings , destined to a certain mode of living or dying, as a function of true discourses which are bearers of the specific effects of power”¹⁷ Jean-François Lyotard, in *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, 1979, observes that ‘Justification, system, proof & the unity of science of modern analytical tradition do no longer hold. Our ‘language games’ no longer require metanarratives to justify the utterances made in them. No legitimation is necessary beyond expediency. The production of knowledge is analyzed in terms of discontinuity, plurality and ‘paralogy’ (logically unjustified conclusions).

. As against the sacred center-stage, conceived to be the bedrock of truth and values, modernism took the form of secularization of the world. When truth conceived within the medieval ontology (‘sacred’) as justified true belief, however compact, itself is a problematic. Related to individualism and value-dualism is the problem of Scientism When this sacred is

¹⁶ Griffin, *Postmodern Visions*, p. 3.

¹⁷ Refer, Michel Foucault: *Power/Knowledge*: 1976. p. 93

encroached/trespassed by means of secular paradigm i.e. truth reduced to its conditions, a process of secularization during the epoch of modernity, constructing an alternate foundation for knowledge, truth and values remains to be yet another problematic of modernity. Rationalization (secularization) as a vital truth condition of knowledge progressively eliminates or subdues the ethical map of diverse cultures and religious traditions. The elimination of the sacred as non-verifiable was made possible with the epistemological dictum that any thing to be true is ought to be rationally and empirically determined gives rise to the problem of *ontologizing* knowledge (knowledge have structures independent perceiving mind and the social conditions) as objective and benchmarking its criterion as empirical-rational with in modernity (*isomorphic*) and treating knowledge as productive (*pragmatic*) conceives serious ethical issues. In Habermas's early attempt in *Knowledge and Human Interests*, the critique of instrumental reason of modernism is reformulated as a critique of 'scientism'. For Habermas, Scientism means ... that we no longer understand science as one form of possible knowledge, but rather identify knowledge with science".¹⁸ Focusing on the relation between positivism and science, Habermas argues that positivist verificationism provides scientism with its sophisticated philosophical defense. Rick Roderick elaborates Habermas's criticism: "Positivism began as a critique of ideology of pre-modern metaphysics, turned into a technocratic consciousness, a key feature of modern ideology. The rise of scientism turned from any inquiry into the conditions for the possibility of knowledge thus emptying itself from being critical, and ended with denial of reflection"¹⁹. Along with Horheimer who criticism modern forms of knowledge, Habermas holds that knowledge is not just scientific but it is socially rooted and interest bound.

In modern times, the western secular-scientific-technocratic male crowned himself as the author of truth and social values. The authorship of God or Spirit was eroded or rendered meaningless purely from a scientific-rational lens alone. Modernity reduced truth and values to the touch stone of mere objectivity, empirical-positivistic verifiability and pragmativity. Humans of modernity engaged the belief that human problem can be solved and progress can be achieved purely by rational-logos and techno-logos. But then the opposite have occurred in the face of the earth. New forms of colonialism, massive ecological destruction, extreme poverty, value-problems related to cloning, birth control, destruction of biodiversity etc result out of this modernist perception. Scientific advancements unfortunately achieved the myths of human progress and development. Technology advances but humans are increasingly consumed into the world of technology. Humans become mechanized, *technocratized*, calculated and are reduced into automatons. Jurgen Habermas states (*The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*. 1985, Lecture X) that 'Individuals are not the primary subjects of knowledge because knowledge is embodied in instruments and systems of domination; to count something as knowledge is to recognize it as having a certain power'. Desirous of making man as the center of the globe, modernity while reducing man to a machine, placed the machine (the man-like/image of man) as the ruling power center. Military and machine power have already begun to dominate the human,

¹⁸ Jurgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, p. 4.

¹⁹ Rick Roderick, *Habermas and the Foundations of Critical Theory*, (MacMillan Pub, 1986) pp. 50-51.

the non-machine. Those who are in possession of technocratic power deem themselves superior and therefore self-justified to control and dominate the powerless ones. As a result, the end of 20th and beginning of 21st century is seriously engaged into a discourse of self-projected or state-projected forms of terrorism. Richard Rorty, observes that, 'the traditional philosophical pursuit of ultimate, transcendental, foundational knowledge is not a valid or desirable enterprise. (However) Our vocabularies (in the modern philosophical pursuits) can not be grounded in an appeal to mere "objectivity". The pragmatic alternative sees legitimation of social power as "solidarity" or culture²⁰. Thus the epistemic paradigm of modernity that had promised human progress and development has unfortunately proved itself to be an illusion and a trap.

The components of modernity such as individualism, rationalism, dualism, pragmatism, nationalism, secularism, if/when applied unreflectively result in homogenization of culture of the western center which in turn conceives itself as the power-center of the world (egology). The ego of the rational self (of the western-European) is replaced at the centre-stage leaving behind the rest of the people and nations in stratified realms of hierarchical power relations. The epistemic burden of modernity creates multiple levels of crisis in the cultural, social, ideological and most fundamentally ethical ecologies. In analyzing the problems of the episteme of modern epoch, Foucault rightly points out: "How the discourse of truth or quite simply, philosophy is as that discourse which par excellence is concerned with truth, able to fix the limits (of truth) to the rights of power? The problem is rather this: what rules of right are implemented by the relations of power in the productions of the discourse of truth? Or alternatively, what type of power is susceptible of producing the discourse of truth that in a society which as ours are endowed with such potent effects?"²¹ The points of assertion here is that we need to pronounce a rupture from the specific forms of knowledge/truth proposed and practiced in the modern era.

The epistemic script of modernity needs to be evaluated on social conditions that produced it. And the invitation here is to look into the agenda and the voice of the postmodern sensibilities of knowledge and ethics, which is that of a transformative intellectual character, whose practical interest is the affirmation of the lives of the broken-particulars, who are historically and increasingly thrown-away by the dominant paradigms of knowledge/truth of both pre-modernity and modernity. The question of epistemic justification of truth in philosophy must be evaluated on the grounds of the resulting social conditions it has produced rather than analyzing it in the circularity of epistemic frames. What needs to be done is to something different. Instead of analyzing truth within the truth-conditions of any epistemic-systems, the very grounds that produced truth for its sake or power-relations, we need to investigate historically, beginning from the lowest level, how mechanisms of power have been able to function as mechanisms of/for production of truth that enables or disables the scope/limits of knowledge and social power to the advantage of the practice of domination and subordination that endangers our very understanding of truth, in favor of the ethos of the domination. We need to expose how mechanisms of domination and power produced truth(s) and by producing them promoted *a society of normalization*. One of the ways of doing this is to expose their logic of domination and transmutations and render it naked in order toward the promotion of a

²⁰ Refer Richard Rorty's works on 'Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature: 1979, and his essay on "Solidarity or Objectivity?" 1985.

²¹ See, Michel Foucault: Power/Knowledge: 1976.

compatible society. The postmodern reflections on the social conditions of knowledge and truth conceive ample possibilities for such considerations. Postmodernists argue for a plurality of 'truths' existing alongside one another. They assert that all beliefs are a matter of social context. What is 'right', for them, is socially determined. Diversity of viewpoints is thus celebrated implying that diversity of forms of life needs to be affirmed rather than tolerated.

The problematic context of modernity conceives the cause for the emergence of its criticisms characterized as Postmodernism. The suspicion of modernity projected the postmodern moment. Postmodernity is modernity without illusions. Postmodernism as a critique of modernity (unlike modernity) has no singular or monopolizing epistemic justifications or outlook of life. It has expressed itself in diverse ways. There are varieties of Postmodernism. When it does not want to lose the constructive side of modernism and as well extends itself to a kind of 'ideal communicative speech situation' with an emancipatory project, it is branded as critical theory (Habermas) and it is called late modernism. When the presuppositions of modernity are scrutinized to their logical conclusions, it is called ultra modernism or post-modernism. When it challenges the epistemological claims of modernity or revises them with a sense of reconstructing something afresh, it is called revisionary Postmodernism. When it criticizes and deconstructs the claim that meaningfulness is a matter of essentiality or mere subjectivity or pure objectivity, it is called deconstructionism (Derrida). When it claims that knowledge or truth is context-conditioned, and meaning is more than a mere representation or resemblance or objectivity it is called Post Structuralism (Sassure). Truth according to postmodernism is multivalent and it lies in the pluralistic context of simultaneous presence of the Others. When it is opposed to any form of centrism including itself as the central way of conceiving the world, and disposes any central sense of truth it is called negative Postmodernism. Some say that Postmodernism by negating itself, loses its foundations and therefore lacks any standards of knowledge or truth and value-claims. The critiques of Postmodernism say that it is self-negating. As against this, I would like to argue that the collective layers of criticisms levied against Postmodernism are the pivotal points that alternatively promote an affirmative sense of Postmodernism. Its relative standpoint with reference to meaningfulness or truth-claims, its negation of centre-stage discourse, its exposition of the dangers of modernity, its negation of the claim that truth is valued only to the foundations of either subjectivity or objectivity, its exposition of the immoral side of modernity etc., point towards a specific forms of social ethics, namely the affirmation and the celebration of any broken-particulars based on the idea of inescapable social responsibility.

The philosophical and ethical dimensions of postmodernism may be characterized as an attempt to devalue/rethink the strong emphasis of modern sense of epistemology namely the rationalist and empiricist characteristic of knowledge and self. It is an attempt to evaluate the dubious moralistic orientations of capitalistic individualism, consumerism, and monopolization of culture, dualism, secularism and social Darwinism. Alternatively it argues for practical erosion of the self-centered ego of modernity. As a matter of ethical necessity, the ethics of Postmodernism conceives the notion of self as plurality of selves, and therefore the diverse forms of life to be plural and interrelated. Postmodernists such as Lyotard, Levinas, Foucault and many others establish the fact that human self 'as a position in a vast web of communication circuits. There is no question of a stable and autonomous self that mirrors the world'²². Rather each self exists in a fabric of relations that is complex and mobile. Society according to this view is plural

²² Jean-Francois Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi, *Theory and History of Literature* 10 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), p. 15.

and every self is socially and cultural engaged self. Kenneth Gergen argues, “we are not one, or a few ...we contain multitudes. And we become populated”²³ Such a position propels the view that as humans we are inherently interrelated and it is this relationship that makes us humane. This sense of postmodern consciousness has to be upheld in order to confront the epistemological and social problematic of modernity.

Postmodernism in short is a pronouncement of the end of the evils of modernity. Postmodernism is a proclamation of the closure of the script of modernity. Pronouncing the death of God, the death theo-logos of the medieval and the onto-logos of the modern periods, Nietzsche announced the birth of a super-ego; the postmodernists with a serious sense of affirmative social commitment declare the death of such super-ego and replace it with non-centric community of selves. Postmodern ethic is an invitation to think afresh the one sided value- foundations, shaped by enlightenment episteme and ethics. It calls for entertaining a profound doubt on the so-called indubitable foundations of knowledge with a sense of ethic of plurality. Postmodern ethic calls for a greater moment of massive intellectual and Cultural resistance and revolutions. In announcing the death modernity, Postmodern ethic expresses itself in diverse forms such as neo-Marxism that exposes the determinism of Marxism and modern forms of capitalism, Feminism that negates all forms of male domination, ecological movement that restores the value of nature; and in India, the postmodern consciousness may be characterized as the restoration of the ethnic identities that are submerged and historically devalued in different forms of caste constructions of the dubious forms of Indian medievalism and caste assimilated-modernity.

The ethical content of Postmodernism is not mere relativistic pluralism but a serious sense of the affirmation of the social particulars by means of collective consciousness and resistance of/to the forces of power domination and power relations. By resisting all forms of oppression and domination, postmodern ethic calls for an aesthetic celebration of the liberation of the broken-particular. Both by resistance to domination and reclamation of the broken-particular, the postmodern trends leap towards an ethical turn. The Postmodern sense of ethical is not vertical morality, a top-bottom administered relation, on any centre stone guarantee of truth, rather it projects multiple sensibilities with specific identification of the voices of the suffering peoples towards the ‘cessation of social suffering’, an inescapable necessity (ethical imperative) to restore the whole by affirming life.

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