The Imperative of Social Self by Rethinking About Thought About Self

Abstract

The notion of ‘self’ is central to most philosophical positions both in western and eastern traditions. The issue that I propose to address here is to examine whether the thought patterns about self is sufficiently social or not, for reason that if and if the self is considered social within our metaphysical foundations there is a possibility of being socially authentic and if not, I argue that our claims to be ‘social’ is either insufficient or not necessarily social in terms of either individual or a configuration of individuals (groups/associations). To this task, “It is necessary to dig deeper, down to the very meaning of the notion of Being, and to show that the origin of all being, including that of nature is determined by the intrinsic meaning of conscious life and not the other way around” hence the central questions that this paper attempts to address as follows: (i) Is there a sense of being that is philosophically considered to be ‘worthy being’? (ii) And if so, whether such philosophical sensibilities of a ‘worthy being’ agreeable? If agreeable, is such agreeability justifiably agreeable or philosophically justified? (iii) And if not, what is the specific forms or sensibilities by which the so-deemed philosophical sensibilities of a worthy being be contested? (iii) The basic issue would then be -Are the philosophical sensibilities of ‘being’ worthy enough to be considered the worth of being? The inquiry thus pertains to whether the notions of Being/Self (within the philosophical traditions) authentic enough and if not sufficiently authentic and how/why do we (eed to) argue towards an authentic sense of Being/Self.